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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal raises a straightforward but important legal 
question:  Do Petitioners allege sufficient facts to state a claim for 
declaratory and mandate relief based on allegations that 
Respondent water boards have a pattern and practice of shirking 
their legal duties to implement mandatory agricultural pollution 
control measures?  The case authorities discussed below compel 
the conclusion that Petitioners adequately allege such a pattern 
and practice claim.   
Petitioners thus seek reversal of the trial court’s order on 
demurrer.  Petitioners allege that Respondent water boards have 
failed for many decades to protect California’s dwindling drinking 
water supplies by repeatedly ignoring two independent legal 
duties: one arising from a state regulation that applies to 
agricultural pollution, which this Court has held is mandatory in 
Monterey Coastkeeper v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 28 Cal. 
App. 5th 342 (2018) and another arising from the State’s 
affirmative duty under the public trust doctrine to protect water 
resources, as defined in National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior 
Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).  Because Petitioners First Amended 
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint (“FAC”) alleges that 
Respondents have systematically ignored these legal duties, the 
demurrer should have been overruled.   
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The trial court offered three reasons for dismissing 
Petitioners’ claims: (1) the claims do not state an actual 
controversy and are not amenable to specific relief; (2) providing 
a judgment would require review of complex discretionary 
decisions; and (3) relief is not available when fulfilling a 
mandatory duty that entails the exercise of discretion.  Each of 
these grounds constitutes reversible error.   
First, the courts have expressly held that a program-wide 
practice of ignoring governing laws, which Petitioners allege has 
occurred over decades here, is properly the subject of a 
declaratory relief action.  Such actions are justiciable and state 
an active controversy.   
Second, where the existence of an illegal pattern is alleged, 
the trial court cannot sustain a demurrer on the basis that the 
court would have to review each discretionary decision to discern 
a pattern.  Such allegations are accepted as true on demurrer.  
Courts have already reviewed numerous successive individual 
administrative records and determined that Respondent water 
boards’ decisions failed to follow the law.  That is, Petitioners 
properly alleged claims for declaratory relief and traditional 
mandate under CCP section 1085, separate from any CCP section 
1094.5 action challenging each illegal permit.   
Third, where agencies exercise discretion in fulfilling a 
mandatory or ministerial duty, mandamus relief is available, so 
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long as courts do not require agencies to exercise discretion in a 
particular way.  When courts enforce a mandatory duty, they do 
not thereby substitute their policy judgments for those of the 
agency; relief ordered ensures that citizens can seek redress for 
an agency’s abdication of its legal duty by failing to act.   
This Court should thus reverse the dismissal.  In the 
alternative, the trial court should be directed to grant Petitioners 
leave to amend.  Otherwise, the agencies primarily responsible 
for water quality would have no accountability for specific 
mandatory duties set forth in foundational water law, despite 
repeated judicial mandates issued under CCP section 1094.5 
against Respondents.   
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. The Water Boards’ Mandatory Duties Under the 
Porter-Cologne Act and the Common Law Public 
Trust Doctrine 
A. The Porter-Cologne Act 
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (the “Porter-
Cologne Act”) regulates all discharges that “could affect” water 
quality, including agricultural discharges.  See Cal. Water Code 
§ 13260.1  In adopting the Porter-Cologne Act, the California 
                                         
1 All statutory references here are to the Water Code unless 
otherwise indicated.   
D
oc
um
en
t r
ec
ei
ve
d 
by
 th
e 
C
A
 3
rd
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 o
f 
A
pp
ea
l.
 14 
Legislature found that “the people of the state have a primary 
interest in the conservation, control, and utilization of the water 
resources of the state, and that the quality of all the waters of the 
state shall be protected for use and enjoyment by the people of 
the state.”  § 13000.  Activities that may affect the State’s water 
quality thus must be “regulated to attain the highest water 
quality which is reasonable.”  Id.  This obligation attaches to both 
groundwater and surface water.  §§ 13001, 13050(e).   
Respondent water boards are the “principal” state agencies 
with “primary responsibility” for controlling the State’s water 
quality.  §§ 13001, 13223.  Namely, these Respondents 
(collectively, “Water Boards”) are the State Water Resources 
Control Board (“State Board”), the Central Coast Regional Water 
Quality Control Board (“Central Coast Regional Board”), and the 
Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (“Central 
Valley Regional Board”).  The State Board sets policy.  See 
§ 13140.  The regional boards formulate water quality 
management plans, referred to as “basin plans,” that must 
conform to the State Board policies.  § 13240.  Basin plans 
identify “beneficial uses” of the waters such as for drinking water 
supply, fishing, agricultural supply, and ecological functions.  
§ 13050(f).  All beneficial uses must be protected.  § 13241. 
To meet basin plan water quality objectives, regional 
boards regulate the discharge of waste primarily through the 
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imposition of conditions and prohibitions on dischargers.  These 
conditions and prohibitions are contained in permits known as 
“waste discharge requirements” or in “conditional waivers” of 
waste discharge requirements.  §§ 13243, 13263, 13269.  A 
“general” permit in lieu of individual permits may regulate a 
class of similar dischargers.  Id. §§ 13263, 13269.  All permits 
must be designed to achieve water quality standards.  §§ 13260, 
13263, 13269 & 13240.  Such standards encompass water quality 
objectives and beneficial use designations established in basin 
plans.  Petitioners’ Appendix (“App.”) 2:291.  
In this action, Petitioners challenge the Water Boards’ 
issuance of illegal general permits governing agricultural 
polluters in the Central Valley and Central Coast.   
B. The Nonpoint Source Regulations Adopted in 
Response to Legislative Mandates 
Increasingly concerned about water quality degradation 
even thirty years after the enactment of the Porter-Cologne Act, 
the Legislature has amended the Water Code to require the 
Water Boards to control nonpoint source pollution.  Nonpoint 
sources of pollution include polluted runoff “moving over and 
through the ground, and includes excess fertilizers, herbicides, 
and insecticides from agricultural lands,” City of Arcadia v. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 135 Cal. App. 4th1392, 1403 (2006), as 
distinct from discharges from industrial outfalls and pipes.   
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In 1999, the Legislature amended the Water Code to 
impose a mandatory duty on the State Board to “prepare” and 
“implement” a “nonpoint source management plan.”  See former 
§ 13269(a) & (b)(2) (adopted by Stats. 1999, ch. 560 (S.B. 227), 
§ 1, and renumbered by Stats. 2012, ch. 728 (S.B. 71), § 182, and 
now codified at § 13369b)(2)).   
In “connection with [such] duties,” the State Board was 
mandated to “develop, on or before February 1, 2001, guidance 
. . . for the purpose of describing the process by which the [Water 
Boards] will enforce the state’s nonpoint source management 
plan.”  See former § 13369(a)(2)(B) (adopted by Stats. 1999, ch. 
560 (S.B. 227), § 1) (renumbered by Stats. 2012, ch. 728 (S.B. 71), 
§ 182, and now codified at Water Code § 13369 (b)(2)).  In 2004, 
under this mandate, the State Board adopted the Policy for 
Implementation and Enforcement of the Nonpoint Source 
Pollution Control Program (the “NPS Regulations”).  App. 2:289. 
As a water quality policy required by Water Code section 
13369(b)(2), and approved by the Office of Administrative Law, 
the NPS Regulations have the force and effect of law as a 
regulation.  See WaterKeepers N. Cal. v. State Water Res. Control 
Bd., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 1452 (2002); Monterey Coastkeeper, 
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28 Cal. App. 5th at 349.2   
The NPS Regulations require that nonpoint source 
pollution control permits include five mandatory “Key Elements.”  
Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 349; App. 2:299.  These 
Key Elements are intended to achieve the Water Code’s ultimate 
objective of attaining and maintaining water quality.  Thus, 
permits shall:   
Key Element 1: Address the pollution in a manner that 
achieves water quality objectives and beneficial uses, including 
any applicable antidegradation requirements. 
Key Element 2: Describe management practices and 
program elements to be implemented to ensure a high likelihood 
that the program will attain water quality requirements. 
Key Element 3: Set quantifiable milestones and 
corresponding specific deadlines that measure progress towards 
achieving water quality objectives. 
Key Element 4: Provide sufficient feedback mechanisms to 
ensure that the public can determine whether an implementation 
program is achieving its stated purpose. 
                                         
2 The Nonpoint Source Policy is referred to herein as the NPS 
Regulations not only because it is a regulation under state law, 
but also because of the potential for confusion in discussing 
pattern and practice cases.  Such cases often refer to an agency’s 
“policy” of violating laws, when referring to the agency’s pattern 
of illegal practice or unwritten policy of not adhering to a law.   
D
oc
um
en
t r
ec
ei
ve
d 
by
 th
e 
C
A
 3
rd
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 o
f 
A
pp
ea
l.
 18 
Key Element 5:  Identify potential consequences for failure 
to achieve the program’s stated purpose.   
App. 2:299-303.   
The antidegradation requirements referred to in Key 
Element 1 of the NPS Regulations (“Antidegradation 
Regulations”) are intended to protect high quality surface and 
ground waters from degradation.  Asociacion de Gente Unida por 
el Agua v. Central Valley Water Quality Control Bd., 210 Cal. 
App. 4th 1255, 1259 (2012) (“AGUA”).   
C. The Public Trust Doctrine 
In addition to statutory obligations, the State Board has a 
fiduciary obligation to preserve and protect for current and future 
generations the State’s surface and groundwaters that are 
hydrologically connected to such surface waters.  See Envtl. Law 
Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 26 Cal. App. 5th 844, 859-
60 (2018).  The law is plain: If an agency’s action might harm a 
public trust resource, then the agency has the “affirmative duty 
to take the public trust into account in the planning and 
allocation of trust resources, and to protect public trust uses 
whenever feasible.”  San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands 
Com., 242 Cal. App. 4th 202, 234 (2015) (quoting Nat’l Audubon 
Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446 (1983)). “Any action 
which will adversely affect” a trust resource shall “be made only 
if there has been full consideration of the state’s public interest in 
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the matter.”  San Francisco Baykeeper, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 234 
(quoting Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 
1188-89 (2008)).  
II. Irrigated Agriculture Causes the Most Serious 
Threat to Public Health and Ecological Resources in 
the Central Valley and the Central Coast 
Agricultural water pollution has harmed public health and 
ecological resources across California.  FAC ¶¶ 57-64.3  That is 
particularly true in the Central Valley and Central Coast regions 
where croplands depend on groundwater for irrigation.  FAC 
¶¶ 60-61.  Irrigation not only provides water necessary for 
croplands but also carries pollutants as runoff flows into creeks, 
rivers, and the ocean, and percolates into groundwater.  Id.  
The Water Boards, which are primarily responsible for 
regulating this runoff, have undisputedly identified pollution 
from irrigated agriculture as the primary source of ongoing water 
pollution including as “contaminated irrigation runoff and 
percolation to groundwater causing widespread toxicity, unsafe 
levels of nitrate, unsafe levels of pesticides, and excessive 
sediment in surface waters and/or groundwaters.”  Monterey 
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 352 (reciting the Central Coast 
Regional Board staff assessment).   
                                         
3 Petitioners’ FAC is in the record at App. 1:128-172.   
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As a result – and as Petitioners allege – hundreds of 
thousands of California residents in rural communities currently 
lack clean, safe water for drinking and bathing.  FAC ¶¶ 1, 9, 19, 
60-67, 75-80, 88, 95.  Without change, millions more will likely be 
without drinkable water by 2050.  See FAC ¶ 1, 62.  At the same 
time, pesticides from agricultural operations have impaired 
thousands of surface water bodies, rendering them toxic to fish 
and other aquatic life and threatening the state’s exceptional 
biodiversity.  FAC ¶¶ 13, 66. 
III. The Water Boards’ Continuing Failure to Meet Legal 
Requirements Has Required Repeated Writ Petitions 
to the Courts. 
For over fifty years, the Water Boards have not complied 
with their basic legal duties to regulate discharges from irrigated 
agriculture.  Instead, they have repeatedly tried measures that 
are known to fail: outreach, education, and voluntary pollution 
controls expected of growers.  FAC ¶¶ 84, 89; see also Monterey 
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th 342, 351-52 (describing the Central 
Coast region’s 2004 permit); San Joaquin Res. Conservation Dist. 
v. Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Bd., Case No. 34-2012-
80001186 (Sac Sup. Ct. May 21, 2013) [“CSPA”] at 6-8 (describing 
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inadequacies of the Central Valley region’s 2006 permit, which 
was renewed in 2011) [App. 1:188-190].4  
In response to the Water Boards’ failures, citizens groups 
have been forced to challenge each successive irrigated 
agricultural permit that did not include the mandatory elements 
of the NPS Regulations.  FAC ¶¶ 85-87; see also Monterey 
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 368. 
A. The Central Valley Regional Board’s Pattern 
and Practice of Refusing to Comply with the 
NPS Regulations 
In the Central Valley, where seven million acres of 
irrigated cropland account for three quarters of agricultural 
activities in the State, FAC ¶ 88, Petitioners allege the Central 
Valley Regional Board has repeatedly issued agricultural 
discharge permits that do not comply with its basic duties under 
the NPS Regulations.  As a result, citizens have had to file 
numerous petitions for administrative writs to require the 
Central Valley Regional Board to correct the permits.  FAC 
                                         
4 San Joaquin Resource Conservation District’s case was 
consolidated with California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. 
Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Board, Case No. 
RG12632180, because both cases challenged the Central Valley 
Regional Board’s renewal of an earlier permit.  California 
Sportsfishing Protection Alliance or CSPA is one of the 
Petitioners here.  The consolidated cases are referred to in this 
brief as CSPA because the FAC does so.   
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¶¶ 85-122; see also AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1258, 1286; CSPA 
at 4, 20 [App. 1:186, 202].  Petitioners’ allegations in the FAC, 
which must be taken as true on demurrer, explain in detail the 
Central Valley Regional Board’s pattern and practice of 
unlawfully refusing to address agricultural water pollution.  
Specifically:  
• 1982 Permit: The Central Valley region’s 1982 permit 
largely exempted agricultural operations, with no mention of the 
Antidegradation Regulations, which were in effect at that time.  
FAC ¶ 89. 
• 2003 Permit: The next permit was issued in 2003, in 
response to the tightened Water Code section 13269 and petitions 
from environmental groups concerned about the 1982 exemption 
of agricultural operations.  FAC ¶ 90.  The 2003 permit, 
characterized as the Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program, relied 
on monitoring, education, watershed plans and outreach – with 
no controls at the source of the pollution.  App. 1:186.  The trial 
court in CSPA held that this permit was inconsistent with the 
Antidegradation Regulations.  App. 1:2020. 
• Renewal of the 2003 Permit:  In 2006, the 2003 
permit was renewed without any further analysis under the new 
NPS Regulations adopted in 2004.  FAC ¶ 92.  Citizens were 
again forced to sue, challenging the renewal; the stipulated 
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judgment in the case set a deadline of 2011 for the establishment 
of the Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program.  App. 1:186.   
• Renewal of the 2006 Permit:  In 2011, the illegal 2006 
permit was renewed for another two years in contravention of the 
court-ordered 2011 deadline for adoption of the permanent 
Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program.  FAC ¶ 96; App. 1:186.  The 
Sacramento Superior Court concluded that this permit did not 
comply with NPS and Antidegradation Regulations.  App. 1:201-
203.  The court ordered the Central Valley Regional Board to 
“bring its long-term Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program into 
compliance with the State’s Antidegradation . . . and Nonpoint 
Source [Regulations].”  App. 1:204. 
• The Dairy Permit’s Failure to Comply with 
Antidegradation Regulations:  In 2012, a lawsuit contesting the 
Central Valley permit governing pollution from dairies was 
adjudicated; this Court held that the dairy permit failed to 
comply with the Antidegradation Regulations, emphasizing their 
importance to state water quality.  AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 
1258, 1286.   
• The Eastern San Joaquin Permit:  In 2012, a permit 
for the Eastern San Joaquin watershed was issued.  FAC ¶ 102.  
This 2012 permit, upon appeal, changed multiple times until a 
final version was issued in 2018.  FAC ¶¶ 103-122.  Petitioners 
allege that the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit also does not 
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comply with the Nonpoint Source and Antidegradation 
Regulations.  FAC ¶128. 
• The Public Trust Doctrine:  No Central Valley 
agricultural permit has even considered the public trust doctrine, 
as required by California law.  See FAC ¶ 57-122, 150.   
B. The Central Coast Regional Board’s Pattern 
and Practice of Refusing to Comply with Its 
Duty to Regulate Agricultural Discharges 
Similar to the Central Valley Regional Board’s 
recalcitrance in the face of California’s water crisis, Petitioners 
allege that the Central Coast Regional Board has a pattern and 
practice of failing to comply with its mandatory duties.  In the 
435,000 acres that make up the Central Coast region, every 
permit issued since 1983 has failed to comply with the NPS and 
Antidegradation Regulations.  These failures are detailed in 
Petitioners’ FAC (¶¶ 84-87), as well as numerous rulings by 
California courts finding the Water Boards’ actions unlawful.  See 
Monterey Coastkeeper v. State Water Res. Control Bd., Case No. 
34-2012-80001324 (Sac. Super. Ct., May 15, 2015) at 32-33, 38 
[App. 1:238-239, 244]; Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 
367, 370; Zamora v. Central Coast Regional Water Quality 
Control Bd., Case No. 15CV-0247, 2016 WL 7163991 (San Luis 
Obispo Super. Ct., Oct. 28, 2016).  As with the Central Valley 
Regional Board, no agricultural pollution program in the Central 
Coast has considered the public trust doctrine.  FAC ¶ 150.   
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In sum, Petitioners allege that the Water Boards have 
abdicated mandatory legal duties specified in the NPS 
Regulations and the public trust doctrine in regulating 
agricultural discharges.  They will continue to do so, Petitioners 
further allege, absent court intervention.   
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioners are a diverse group of environmental groups 
concerned about access to safe drinking water, public health, and 
ecological impacts of irrigated agriculture.  The group includes 
those who have filed successful challenges under CCP section 
1094.5 to many of the illegal permits described above.   
On August 3, 2017, to minimize repeated, time-consuming, 
and resource-intensive court challenges, Petitioners filed a 
complaint targeted at ending the Water Boards’ illegal practices.  
This original complaint sought declaratory relief and a writ of 
mandate under CCP section 1085.  It also alleged CCP section 
1094.5 claims concerning the latest permits governing the 
Central Coast and the Central Valley – the 2017 Central Coast 
permit and the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit.  App. 1:009-
011.   
On October 23, 2017, the State Board demurred to the 
Second Cause of Action – which sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief regarding the Water Boards failure to comply 
with the NPS Regulations – on the ground that Petitioners could 
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not state a claim for declaratory relief on the basis that there was 
“no actual, concrete, ripe controversy.”  App. 1:057.  The State 
Board also demurred to the same cause of action on the ground 
that Petitioners could not state a claim for a CCP section 1085 
mandate without identifying a “ministerial duty.”  Id.   
On February 23, 2018, the trial court sustained the 
demurrer after a hearing.  The trial court ruled that “it would be 
both improper and impractical for the court to attempt to 
undertake such a broad, open-ended review of the Board’s 
discretionary decisions.”  App. 1:125.   
At the hearing, the court expressed concern that it “almost 
seems like meaningless relief” to declare the agencies are “not 
doing their job, so do your job.”  Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 6:1-
2, 6:10-11.  The court then provided guidance for amending the 
complaint: “If your cause of action said ‘They’re not following the 
Nonpoint Source Policy,’ that seems to bring you more in line 
with the cases you cite, . . .  the East Bay MUD and the 
Californians for Salmon.  And you say there’s one discreet [sic] 
thing, and then maybe we can, as you say, okay, set timelines, set 
compliance.”  Id. at 7:11-18.   
Following this direction and leave to amend, on March 15, 
2018, Petitioners filed the FAC.  It focused the pattern and 
practice claim on two specific and discrete legal duties.  The new 
Third Cause of Action alleges that the ongoing practice of 
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authorizing agricultural discharges that fail to comply with the 
NPS Regulations is unlawful.  FAC ¶¶ 132-147.  For these 
violations, Petitioners seek declaratory relief and a writ under 
CCP section 1085.  FAC ¶¶ 146-147.  The Fourth Cause of Action 
alleges that the State Board is engaged in ongoing violations of 
its fiduciary duties under the public trust doctrine because it fails 
to consider and avoid or minimize impacts to public trust 
resources.  FAC ¶¶ 148-151.  For these violations, Petitioners 
seek a writ under CCP section 1085.  FAC ¶ 151. 
The Water Boards brought a second demurrer to these 
amended claims.  App. 1:254-255.  As to the ongoing violations of 
the NPS Regulations alleged in the Third Cause of Action, the 
Water Boards demurred on the grounds that the declaratory 
relief claim does not state a cause of action because (1) it does not 
state an “actual, concrete, ripe controversy,” (2) the proper 
challenge should be made to the administrative orders 
“complained of” under CCP section 1094.5, rather than under 
section 1085, and (3) the claim does not identify a “non-
discretionary, ministerial” duty.  Id.  As to the violation of the 
public trust doctrine alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action, the 
Water Boards demurred on the ground that the public trust 
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doctrine does not impose any “non-discretionary, ministerial” 
duty on them.  App. 1:254.5   
On May 11, 2018, the trial court held a hearing following a 
tentative ruling issued the day before.  App. 2:471.  The tentative 
ruling, without explanation as to the nature of the duties alleged, 
stated that “Petitioners are asking the court to undertake a 
broad, comprehensive review of all regional and state actions 
relating to the regulation of agricultural dischargers.”  App. 
2:477.  The court held that Petitioners do not allege an “actual 
controversy” because they “essentially seek a declaration that 
Respondents’ ongoing efforts to address nonpoint source pollution 
and protect resources are not sufficiently ‘effective’ and 
‘environmentally protective.’”  App. 2:477-478.  The court further 
explained its view that mandate does not lie as to “a broad, 
generalized challenge to an agency’s discretionary decisions” – 
that mandate will lie “only if the act is performance of a 
ministerial duty, or discretion to act legally can be exercised in 
only one way.”  App. 2:477.     
During the hearing, in an effort to demonstrate facts that 
could be added with leave to amend and to respond to the court’s 
concern that the claims sought review of multiple individual 
                                         
5 The Water Boards also demurred that declaratory relief was not 
alleged properly as to the public trust doctrine.  App. 1:263 at 6:6-
14.  But Petitioners made no such claim. 
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administrative decisions, Petitioners informed the court that a 
declaration could be filed, attesting that the successive permits in 
the Central Valley and Central Coast regions are intentionally 
designed, as a matter of unwritten policy or practice, to 
circumvent the mandatory NPS Regulations.  RT 20:27-22:10, 
30:7-26.  The trial court did not allow the filing of this 
declaration.  RT 33:20-33:9. 
On May 29, 2018, an order was entered dismissing the 
Third and Fourth Causes of Action based on the trial court’s 
tentative ruling of May 11, 2018, which became final.6  The May 
11, 2018 ruling incorporates the court’s February 23, 2018 ruling.  
App. 1:121.  Neither ruling contains an analysis of the 
discretionary or mandatory nature of agency decisions.   
On July 27, 2018, Petitioners filed a petition for expedited 
review of the dismissal, before the remaining claim, the First 
Cause of Action, was resolved.7  See Petitioners’ Corrected 
                                         
6 The same order disposed of the Second Cause of Action, which 
challenged the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit under CCP 
section 1094.5.  The dismissal is not at issue on this appeal 
(although the Eastern San Joaquin permit is yet more evidence of 
the Water Boards’ pattern); the claim was filed in a separate 
action in the Sacramento Superior Court.  Monterey Coastkeeper 
v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd., Case No. 
34-2018-80002853 (Sacramento Super. Ct. filed Mar. 28, 2018).   
7 Because the First Cause of Action is a CCP 1094.5 challenge to 
the Central Coast’s 2017 permit, which presented the same legal 
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Petition for Writ of Mandate (C087635 incorporated by reference) 
[App. 1:007].  On August 24, 2018, this Court denied the petition 
for expedited review.  On September 18, 2018, Monterey 
Coastkeeper was decided.  See 28 Cal. App. 5th at 342. 
On September 27, 2019, after a settlement conference, the 
parties resolved the First Cause of Action through a Stipulated 
Judgment Granting Writ of Mandate, disposing of all of the 
claims in the action.  App. 2:486-490.    
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal challenges the Superior Court’s Order 
Sustaining Demurrer to Petitioners’ Third and Fourth Causes of 
Action, which was entered on May 29, 2018.  This Order became 
appealable when final judgment was entered on September 27, 
2019, fully disposing of all of the causes of action.  Petitioners 
filed timely Notice of Appeal on November 22, 2019, within 60 
days of final judgment.  App. 2:493.  This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to CCP section 904.1(a). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from a judgment dismissing a claim after 
sustaining a demurrer, the court first reviews the complaint “de 
                                                                                                               
issues as the 2013 permit at issue in Monterey Coastkeeper, the 
parties had agreed to hold the claim in abeyance pending a 
decision in Monterey Coastkeeper.   
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novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a 
cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed 
true for this purpose,” or to determine whether the trial court 
erred as a matter of law.  Potocki v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 38 
Cal. App. 5th 566, 569 (2019) (quoting Committee for Green 
Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors, 48 Cal. 4th 
32, 42 (2010)).  In this review, the court gives the complaint “a 
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in 
their context,” but “not assuming the truth of contentions, 
deductions or conclusions of law.”  City of Dinuba v. City of 
Tulare, 41 Cal. 4th 859, 865 (2007).   
The appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision to 
sustain the demurrer without leave to amend for abuse of 
discretion, deciding “whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the defect can be cured by amendment.”  Id.  “[I]f it can be, 
the trial court has abused its discretion.”  Id. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the Demurrer 
for Declaratory Relief by Requiring More Than 
Allegations of the Water Boards’ Ongoing Failure to 
Comply with the NPS Regulations. 
Petitioners’ Third Cause of Action alleges sufficient facts to 
state a claim for declaratory relief under CCP section 1060.  
Petitioners are entitled to a declaratory judgment based on their 
allegations of the Water Boards’ consistent and ongoing practice 
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of failing to include the five mandatory Key Elements of the NPS 
Regulations in agricultural permits regulating the Central Valley 
and Central Coast regions.  The trial court misconstrued the 
nature of the duties under the NPS Regulations, which are 
mandatory, not discretionary.  As a result, the trial court 
mistakenly concluded that declaratory relief ordering the Water 
Boards to comply with the law they are violating would be futile.  
Yet declaratory relief does exactly that: declare that an agency is 
violating a law.  It is error to sustain a demurrer when a claim 
has been stated.  Therefore, dismissal of the declaratory relief 
claim should be reversed.   
A. Petitioners’ Allegations that the Water Boards 
Have Ignored Mandatory Duties State a Claim 
for Declaratory Relief. 
Section 1060 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that any person “who desires a declaration . . . may, in 
cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties 
of the respective parties, bring an original action in the superior 
court . . . for a declaration of his rights and duties.”  CCP § 1060.   
A declaratory relief claim is properly stated under CCP 
section 1060 when a state agency has a de facto practice of 
ignoring or violating legal duties it is entrusted to implement.  
Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., 23 
Cal. App. 5th1040, 1046 (2018); K.G. v. Meredith, 204 Cal. App. 
4th 164, 177 (2012) (declaratory relief action “is an appropriate 
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means of challenging an alleged ‘overarching’ policy or practice of 
an agency”); Clovis Unified Dist. v. Chiang, 188 Cal. App. 4th 
794, 808-09 (2010) [“Clovis”] (same).  
In a case alleging a pattern and practice, a court cannot 
sustain a demurrer for failing to state a claim when the 
complaint alleges (1) “the nature of the duties imposed on [an 
agency] by law”; and (2) the agency’s practice of ignoring the duty 
or law.  Californians for Native Salmon etc. Assn. v. Department 
of Forestry, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1419 (1990) [“Native Salmon”].   
Petitioners’ allegations meet the Native Salmon 
requirements.  Petitioners allege the Water Boards have a 
mandatory legal duty to include the Key Elements of the NPS 
Regulations in the agricultural permits for two specific regions – 
the Central Valley and the Central Coast.  FAC ¶¶ 7, 8, 38-40, 
45, 47, 135-138.  They further allege that the Water Boards have 
for decades systematically ignored these ministerial duties 
despite Petitioners’ numerous successful court challenges.  FAC 
¶¶ 81, 82, 86, 136, 140-141, 142.  These allegations state a 
present, actual, and existing controversy between Petitioners and 
Respondents as to the legality of these failures, which should be 
resolved by declaratory judgment.   
Similar allegations have been deemed sufficient at the 
demurrer stage; no more is required.  See Venice Town Council, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1547, 1560, 1566 
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(1996) (error to sustain a demurrer to a declaratory relief claim 
alleging defendant has a “de facto” policy of “ignoring or 
violating” a statute); Alameda Cty. Land Use Ass’n v. Hayward, 
38 Cal. App. 4th 1716, 1722-23 (1995) (error to sustain demurrer 
“when the complaint reveals” a dispute over “whether a public 
entity has engaged in conduct or established policies in violation 
of applicable law.”).  Thus, Petitioners’ Third Cause of Action 
sufficiently states a claim for declaratory relief.     
B. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that 
Petitioners’ Declaratory Relief Claim Does Not 
Present a Specific and Concrete Controversy.  
In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court found that 
Petitioners do not allege an “actual controversy relating to the 
legal rights and duties of the respective parties.”  App. 2:477 
(citing CCP § 1060).  This ruling is error.  It disregards precedent 
such as Native Salmon, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1419, and misconstrues 
the gravamen of Petitioners’ declaratory relief claim, the nature 
of the Water Boards’ duty, and the justiciability of pattern and 
practice claims.   
1. Petitioners’ case, alleging a pattern of 
continuing noncompliance, presents an 
actual controversy justiciable in the 
courts. 
The trial court erroneously concluded that Petitioners’ 
claim does not present an actual controversy.  The trial court 
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opined that Petitioners “seek a general declaration that the State 
Board simply ‘isn’t doing enough’” in connection with its 
obligation to supervise regional boards in their regulation of 
agricultural discharges, or that the Water Boards’ “ongoing 
efforts to address nonpoint source pollution . . . are not 
sufficiently ‘effective’ and ‘environmentally protective.’”  App. 
2:474, 478.   
But Petitioners’ claim is not that the permits should be 
more “effective”; rather, Petitioners allege that the Water Boards’ 
conduct has been unlawful in failing to include the Key Elements 
of the NPS Regulations.  FAC at ¶ 8.  Such claims are amenable 
to declaratory relief because an actual controversy exists when an 
agency entrusted with implementing a law has consistently failed 
to do so, and judicial intervention is required to declare the 
course of action illegal.  See Clovis, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 808-09 
(granting declaratory relief for State Controller’s “overarching” 
policy of using unenforceable audit parameters); Venice Town 
Council, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1566 (error to sustain demurrer as to 
city’s “de facto” policy); East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. v. Dep’t of 
Forestry & Fire Prot., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1996).   
Courts have explicitly recognized that a pattern and 
practice case does not “merely express[ ] dissatisfaction” with the 
individual administrative actions underlying the pattern.  Native 
Salmon, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1428.  Rather, when an agency 
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“refuses to act at all under a misconception of the duty imposed 
upon [it] by law, the courts will correct the error” through 
declaratory relief.  Bess v. Park, 132 Cal. App. 2d 49, 55, (1955). 
The primary case on which the trial court relied for its 
ruling, Zetterberg v. State Dep’t of Public Health, 43 Cal. App. 3d 
657 (1974), makes it plain that the trial court misconstrued the 
nature of declaratory relief actions.  See App. 2:478.  Zetterberg 
states the unremarkable rule that the controversy must be 
actual: “the controversy must be of character which admits of 
specific and conclusive relief . . . as distinguished from an 
advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts.”  
Id. at 661 (emphasis added).   
Unlike in Zetterberg, Petitioners do not request “a general 
declaration regarding the duties of an [agency]” untethered to a 
particular controversy.  See id. at 661.  Rather, Petitioners allege 
a pattern and practice of illegal conduct that can be remedied by 
a judgment declaring the practice illegal.  In this case, in contrast 
to Zetterberg, the Legislature has already imposed the duty of 
implementing the NPS Regulations on the Water Boards.  This is 
an actual controversy that can and should be resolved by 
declaratory relief. 
Moreover, Zetterberg was decided on summary judgment.  
43 Cal. App. 3d at 660.  Here, Petitioners have not yet had an 
opportunity to develop their facts because the trial court 
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sustained the demurrer and denied discovery.  App. 2:479-80.  
Even without discovery, Petitioners alleged the existence of a 
pattern of illegal practice concerning a regulation that the parties 
agree applies to the permits at issue here.  With discovery, 
Petitioners could have shown that the Water Boards’ policy was 
purposeful based on their experience with agency staff.  RT 
20:27-22:10, 30:7-26.  Although not required to state a claim, the 
intentional nature of the practice makes declaratory relief an 
especially important check on the executive branch.8 
2. Petitioners’ claim is amenable to specific 
and conclusive relief because the NPS 
Regulations provide the legal standard. 
The trial court similarly erred in ruling that the 
controversy is not amenable to “specific and conclusive relief.”  
App. 2:478.  The court explained that it “must have ‘narrow, 
precise questions’ that can be ‘tested against legal standards,’ so 
that the court may decree, not suggest, what the parties may or 
may not do.”  Id. (quoting Zetterberg, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 664).   
                                         
8 The trial court also relied on BKHN, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health 
Servs., 3 Cal. App. 4th 301, 309-11 (1992), which similarly stands 
for the unremarkable proposition that a claim must be ripe to be 
adjudicated.  App. 2:478.  Here, ripeness was not at issue.  
Furthermore, BKHN specifically recognized that Native Salmon 
presented a contrasting situation from the one at issue there.  
BKHN, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 311. 
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Here, however, the mandatory NPS Regulations do provide 
narrow and precise legal standards.  The Water Boards are 
directed to implement the NPS Regulations.  Monterey 
Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 367.  The court has the power to 
declare that the Water Boards are failing to comply with the 
mandatory NPS Regulations.  See id.  Thus, the court need not 
“suggest” a remedy; it need only declare that the Water Boards 
are violating the NSP Regulations.   
3. The trial court erred by incorrectly 
assuming that it was required to review 
individual permit actions.  
Petitioners’ declaratory relief claim is focused on the Water 
Boards’ pattern of illegally ignoring the NPS Regulations 
program-wide in issuing irrigated agriculture permits.  This 
claim is distinct from judicial actions challenging individual 
permits, permit-by-permit, which are unquestionably CCP 
section 1094.5 cases.  See AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1266; 
Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 356.   
The trial court misapprehended the case as requiring a 
“broad, comprehensive” judicial review of “all regional and state 
actions relating to the regulation of agricultural discharges.”  
App. 2:477.  As explained above, the Native Salmon line of cases 
recognizes declaratory relief claims alleging an illegal de facto 
practice independent of any CCP section 1094.5 challenge to a 
specific administrative decision.  No broad or comprehensive 
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review is required where, as here, an agency’s illegal pattern and 
practice as to a specific legal requirement – the NPS Regulations 
– is challenged.
If the trial court were correct, Petitioners would be reduced 
to playing whack-a-mole, challenging one permit at a time, 
despite the existence of a pattern of illegal conduct.  Although the 
permits may be complicated, courts have held multiple times that 
the Water Boards’ decisions failed to follow the NPS Regulations.  
See FAC ¶¶ 85-105; Monterey Coastkeeper, 28 Cal. App. 5th 342, 
351-52; AGUA, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 1258, 1286; CSPA at 4, 20 
[App. 1:186, 202].  The law is that when a plaintiff has alleged the 
existence of an illegal pattern of conduct, the existence of the 
pattern is accepted as true, and a demurrer cannot be sustained. 
Native Salmon, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1428 (“appellants’ allegations 
of the [illegal] policies are deemed true by their demurrer”).
4. The trial court erred by considering issues 
other than the sufficiency of Petitioners’ 
allegations. 
When a plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim, a demurrer 
cannot be sustained based on concerns the court may have about 
the nature of the relief that may be granted.  Serrano v. Priest, 5 
Cal. 3d 584, 618-19 (1971) (reversing dismissal of declaratory 
relief claim on demurrer and providing guidance on remedy to be 
provided, should the claim be found meritorious on remand); 
Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency, 108 
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Cal. App. 4th 1028, 1047 (2002) (error to sustain demurrer as “to 
a particular type of damage or remedy”).  Remedy issues are 
irrelevant because the demurrer tests only the sufficiency of the 
pleading.  C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 
4th 861, 872 (2012); Venice Town Council, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 
1562.   
Here, the trial court appears to have been motivated by its 
concern about the futility of declaratory judgments in general, in 
addition to the impact on the court of monitoring the remedy, if 
Petitioners were to win on the merits: 
THE COURT:  But isn’t that the law? . . . “Okay, 
State Board, do your job,” right?  So if I issue that, 
then what?  . . . .  [S]o it almost seems like 
meaningless relief.  I mean, by law, they’re supposed 
to do their job. 
RT 5:23-6:2.  The trial court further speculated about what 
may happen if Petitioners were to prevail: 
I’m not going to be like Judge Henderson in the 
Federal Court . . .  that takes control of the prisons. 
… 
I’m not willing to step in and say I’m going to take 
over the Department and oversee them and make 
sure they do it right. 
… 
[After obtaining a declaratory judgment, Petitioners] 
come back in two or three months and say, “Judge, 
they’re not following the law, they’re not doing what 
you told them to do. 
RT 18:16-22, 19:16-18, 28:20-22.  
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But declaratory judgments provide meaningful relief and 
have done so in seminal public interest cases to address problems 
such as school desegregation, school financing equity, and 
legislative reappointment.  Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 618-19.  A 
“declaratory judgment is a real judgment, not just a bit of 
friendly advice.”  Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 
782 (7th Cir. 2010).  Moreover, the trial court’s speculations 
about what may happen upon entry of judgment are irrelevant at 
the pleading stage.  For all the trial court’s speculations, the 
Water Boards may in fact choose to fully comply with the 
judgment.     
II. Petitioners State a Claim for Traditional Writ Relief 
Based on the Water Boards’ Failure to Comply with 
the NPS Regulations and the Public Trust Doctrine. 
Petitioners’ Third cause of action states a claim under CCP 
section 1085 to correct the Water Boards’ continuing illegal 
practice of failing to comply with the NPS Regulations.  The 
Fourth Cause of Action, too, states a claim for a traditional writ 
to correct the State Board’s utter failure of its duty to consider 
the public trust doctrine.  The trial court nevertheless sustained 
the demurrer as to these claims.  In doing so, the trial court failed 
to recognize the Water Boards’ duties under the NPS Regulations 
and the public trust doctrine as mandatory. 
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A. Writ of Mandate Is Proper to Remedy the Water 
Boards’ Pattern and Practice of Failing to 
Perform Acts Required by Law. 
A traditional writ of mandate “may be issued by any court 
to any . . . board . . . to compel the performance of an act which 
the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, 
or station.”  CCP § 1085. Common Cause v. Bd. of Supervisors, 49 
Cal. 3d 432, 442 (1989). 
Like declaratory relief, a traditional writ under CCP 
section 1085 is independent of redress in a pattern and practice 
case, even when an administrative mandate under CCP section 
1094.5 may be available for case-specific remedies.  Conlan v. 
Bonta, 102 Cal. App. 4th 745, 752 (2002) (CCP § 1094.5 remedy 
“does not preclude a broader challenge to agency conduct or 
procedures alleged to breach the agency’s statutory obligations” 
through CCP § 1085); Timmons v. McMahon, 235 Cal. App. 3d 
512, 517 (1991) (CCP § 1085 proper vehicle to challenge a 
“practice and policy” of denying eligibility for assistance based on 
alleged erroneous interpretation of law).   
Thus, a court cannot sustain a demurrer if the petition 
pleads sufficient “ultimate facts to establish that the action” 
petitioner seeks to compel under CCP section 1085 is “a legal 
duty of the respondent, which it refuses to perform.”  Pich v. 
Lightbourne, 221 Cal. App. 4th 480, 490-91 (2013); Venice Town 
Council, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 1558-61 (error to sustain demurrer 
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when plaintiffs alleged “de facto” illegal practice subject to a CCP 
§ 1085 writ).9   
Here, Petitioners allege a violation of a clear regulatory 
duty – the Water Boards failed to comply with the NPS 
Regulations in numerous permits issued between 2004 and 2018 
and will continue to do so, despite successful court decisions 
under CCP section 1094.5 against the Water Boards.  FAC ¶¶ 84-
122, 132-147.  These allegations are sufficient to state a CCP 
section 1085 writ claim.   
B. Petitioners Allege Sufficient Facts for a Writ of 
Mandate to Compel Compliance with the Public 
Trust Doctrine. 
Petitioners allege that the State Board has not performed a 
public trust analysis in its permitting, and that this failure 
violates the State Board’s public trust duties.  FAC ¶¶ 148-51.   
These allegations are well-grounded in the California Supreme 
Court decision in National Audubon, which held that “[t]he state 
has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in 
                                         
9 Two other elements must be pled: that the petitioner has “a 
beneficial interest in the outcome of the proceedings” and has “no 
other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law.”  Pich, 221 Cal. 
App. 4th at 490-91.  Petitioners pled facts as to these elements.  
FAC ¶¶ 145, 147.  These are not at issue on this appeal.  Neither 
Respondents’ demurrer nor the trial court ruling disputed that 
the elements were pled. 
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the planning and allocation of water resources.” 33 Cal. 3d at 
425, 446 (emphasis added).  “Any action which will adversely 
affect traditional public rights . . . should therefore be made only 
if there has been full consideration of the state’s public interest in 
the matter.”  San Francisco Baykeeper, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 234.     
Groundwater that is hydrologically connected to navigable 
surface waters is also subject to public trust duties.  Envtl. Law 
Found., 26 Cal. App. 5th at 859-60.  Contemporary public trust 
uses include the “preservation of [trust] lands in their natural 
state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific 
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect 
the scenery and climate of the area.”  Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 
251, 259-60 (1971).  
Importantly, the State Board’s public trust obligations 
extend beyond individual permits to the entire program 
governing irrigated agriculture.  See Envtl. Law Found., 26 Cal. 
App. 5th at 862.  As with other legal duties, “[t]he proper means 
to challenge the adequacy” of an agency’s compliance with the 
public trust doctrine is through a petition for writ of mandate.  
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. App. 
4th 1349, 1354 (2008); see also San Francisco Baykeeper, 242 Cal. 
App. 4th at 210-11 (granting writ of mandate); National 
Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 452-53 (same).   
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Here, Petitioners allege the existence of the public trust 
duty, the many public trust uses under threat, and the failure of 
all of the many agricultural permits “to consider the impacts” of 
the permits or the program on “public trust resources and failing 
to protect and avoid or minimize harm to public trust resources to 
the extent feasible.”  FAC ¶¶ 124.c, 128.b; ¶¶ 54, 57, 66, 148-50.  
For example, the 2018 Eastern San Joaquin permit from the 
State Board confirms that the public trust doctrine “has not been 
addressed.”  FAC ¶ 120.  Thus, Petitioners’ writ claim based on 
failure to consider the public trust doctrine should have been 
upheld.   
C. The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the 
Demurrer as to the Writ Claims as They Do Not 
Seek to Direct the Manner in Which Mandatory 
Duties Are Satisfied. 
The trial court concluded that the NPS Regulations and 
Public Trust duties at issue here are not “ministerial dut[ies],” 
where “discretion to act can be exercised in only one way.”  App. 
2:477.  The trial court misapprehended the reach of CCP section 
1085, concluding that the court cannot “control the manner in 
which the agency will exercise its discretion in the future.”  Id.   
As this Court has held, however, “ministerial action or 
mandatory duties to exercise discretion” are subject to a 
traditional writ.  Pich, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 490.  Where an 
agency “does not have a choice whether” to do a certain act, it is 
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mandatory even if there is discretion in implementing the duty.  
Redwood Coast Watersheds All. v. State Bd. of Forestry & Fire 
Prot., 70 Cal. App. 4th 962, 970 (1999).  In Redwood Coast, the 
court explained, “while [the Board] has a discretionary duty to 
determine the content of the regulations . . . [t]he Board does not 
have a choice whether to adopt such regulations: the [statute] 
unqualifiedly requires it to adopt them.”  Id.   
Similarly, in Sanitation Agencies, the Court held that 
traditional writ was proper to require a regional water board to 
comply with mandatory basin plan requirements even though the 
regional board had discretion in crafting the permit at issue.  Cal. 
Ass’n of Sanitation Agencies v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 208 
Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1461-62 (2012).  The Sanitation Agencies 
court aptly observed that “issuing a traditional writ does not 
mean the courts should or will become a kind of ‘Supervising 
Board of Water Quality Control.’  . . .  But if an agency is 
categorically refusing to carry out its statutory and regulatory 
obligations in the face of evidence that would require it to take 
action, the law must provide a remedy.”  Id.  Here, the Water 
Boards have discretion in crafting the permit program and the 
permits but must do so in compliance with the mandatory Key 
Elements.   
As to the public trust doctrine, too, the writ sought here is 
simply to require the State Board to take the public trust into 
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account in the permits.  As this Court pointed out in in 
Environmental Law Foundation, if a writ is issued after trial 
directing the State Board to consider the public trust, “[p]recisely 
what that action would be is an issue that is left for another day.”  
26 Cal. App. 5th at 870 n.2 (emphasis in original).  The trial court 
thus erred in finding that issuing a CCP section 1085 writ would 
impermissibly infringe on agency discretion. 
III. The Trial Court Erroneously Denied Petitioners 
Leave to Amend the Complaint. 
In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, “the court 
may, in furtherance of justice . . . allow, upon any terms as may 
be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding.”  CCP 
§ 473(a)(1).  Unless the complaint, liberally construed, “shows on 
its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to 
amend constitutes an abuse of discretion.”  Sheehan v. San 
Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 45 Cal. 4th 992, 1003 (2009).  A court 
should only deny leave to amend if the complaint fails to state a 
cause of action under any possible legal theory.  Id. at 1003.      
Petitioners allege sufficient facts concerning the violation of 
the Water Boards’ mandatory duties.  If this Court were to 
determine, however, that Petitioners should have alleged 
additional facts, Petitioners should be provided an opportunity to 
do so in this public interest case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully request that the Court reverse the 
dismissal of the Third and Fourth Causes of Action in the First 
Amended Complaint and direct the trial court to overrule the 
demurrer.  In the alternative, the Court should grant leave to 
amend to enable Petitioners to allege any facts that are lacking to 
state a claim in this meritorious case.  
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